The paper seeks to compare and contrast how different EEA (European Economic Area) member states have adopted and made use of the public service obligation (PSO) mechanism in air transport. Analysis shows that there is considerable variation in the extent and way in which various countries have adopted the PSO mechanism. Some countries, such as France, the Irish Republic and Norway, have made extensive use of PSOs on their domestic scheduled air services networks. This is in contrast to the approach adopted in the United Kingdom, where a number of lifeline air services are vulnerable to potentially adverse airline pricing and output decisions. This suggests that there are major inconsistencies in the approach and commitment to social air services provision across the European Union which may undermine broader policy initiatives designed to enhance mobility and accessibility.
Introduction
Subsidies awarded by regional and national governments to air carriers within the European Union are allowed within the framework of Article 4 of Council Regulation aforementioned regulation, EU member states and two EFTA 1 countries (Iceland, Norway) have the legal authority to impose a public service obligation (PSO) and award financial compensation (subsidy) to an air carrier operating scheduled services. PSOs can be imposed by member states on a route between two airports within their territorial jurisdiction or an airport within their jurisdiction and an airport in another member state.
Public service obligations are imposed where adequate provision of air services in terms of regularity of service, capacity and pricing is not possible if carriers are solely taking their own commercial considerations into account. The rationale for imposing a PSO is to sustain air services to remote regions for economic development purposes.
Eight EU member states (France, Germany, Irish Republic, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK) and Iceland and Norway currently impose public service obligations, the vast majority of which are on domestic routes. Cross-border PSOs are imposed in relation to several routes from Strasbourg, services between Erfurt in Germany and Brussels, and between Derry in Northern Ireland (UK) and Dublin in the Irish Republic.
To date, there has been comparatively little research published on the subject of the PSO system or on broader social air services subsidy policy issues. Some countries such as France, the Irish Republic and Norway have had several years experience administering
PSOs. There is considerable scope therefore to investigate whether the system has worked favourably and to identify the extent to which administrative authorities, small community stakeholders and air carriers have experienced difficulties in coping with the legislative parameters set by the PSO system. The number of PSOs in operation has expanded considerably since the very first tenders were issued in the Irish Republic. By 1 European Free Trade Association the end of 1997 there were 64 PSO routes in operation, 42 of them in France. By
September 2001, the total number of PSOs had expanded to 164.
It is clear that the PSO mechanism has become increasingly used. It is therefore timely to compare and contrast the way PSOs have been adopted by different countries. The following section provides a brief introduction to the issue with references to past literature on the subject. Section 3 contrasts the extent to which different countries have adopted the PSO system. A discussion of the different ways in which PSOs have been adopted in terms of minimum service level specifications and issues relating to the setting of maximum air fares and subsidy levels are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 assesses the different attitudes towards PSOs prevailing in different countries and where and how the line is drawn between a PSO route and a non-PSO route. The paper concludes with some recommendations as to how the PSO mechanism could be improved upon and includes a brief outline of further research possibilities. A map showing the precise locations of airports and communities cited in this paper is contained in Appendix A.
Information on specific requirements (capacity, fares, frequency, aircraft size, etc) for
PSO tenders are published in editions of the Official Journal of the European
Communities. For the purposes of this paper these editions were gathered electronically from the Eurolaw website 2 .
Background
2 www.ili.co.uk
Individual member states, through the relevant central government department have the legal authority to impose PSOs. PSOs can be awarded, administered and subsidised by either regional or national governments, either directly or through associated agencies.
The process involves initially issuing an invitation to tender which must be published in million. In contrast to the EU approach, which allows for regional (member state) subsidiarity in deciding on which routes should be subsidised, the EAS programme sets out those communities that are eligible to have subsidised air services on the basis of distance from the nearest large, medium, small and non-hub commercial airport (Reynolds-Feighan, 1999) . The Secretary of Transportation determines the level of service for each remote community. If a service is not being provided on a commercial basis, the DoT invites carriers to tender and specify the level of subsidy required. In contrast to the PSO scheme, a second carrier that is able to offer subsidy-free services can enter the market. In these circumstances, the DoT gives notice to the incumbent that the subsidy is to be withdrawn and the incumbent then has the choice of operating services without subsidy or discontinuing services. According to Reynolds-Feighan (1996) , this provision for market entry provides incentives for minimising subsidy levels. The EAS limits the level of subsidy to US$200 per passenger.
The robustness of the EAS system has been strongly tested since the events of September 11, 2001 as air carriers in the United States have been reducing service levels particularly to small communities. This trend has been exacerbated by low cost carriers which have increased their services at medium and large-size hub airports, thereby adversely affecting traffic levels at small airports within the same catchment area (ATI, 2003) .
According to ATI (2003) , critics argue that the EAS eligibility criteria remains too restrictive and is subject to differing interpretation. For example, the DoT rejected the community of Lancaster's application for EAS subsidy because it was deemed to be 65.3 miles from Pennsylvania calculated on the basis of the shortest distance using small roads rather than the most commonly used road 3 .
In the first published critique of Article 4 of Regulation 2408/92, Reynolds-Feighan (1995) argued that the European Commission (EC) should consider adopting some of the features of the EAS system. The author identified two key deficiencies in the PSO system, one relating to member state-level administration of PSOs and the other the existence of barriers to entry. Administration of PSOs by individual member states is criticised on the basis that there has been an inconsistent application of the PSO instrument across the EU leading to imbalances in the level and provision of air services to small communities. Reynolds-Feighan (1995) argued that a centralised EU-level programme would lead to a more transparent process and greater efficiency in the matching of funds to regional needs.
It was also noted that the regulation does not deal with the payment of subsidies for proposed service levels that are an improvement on or are in addition to the minimum levels stipulated in the tender. Member-state level administration of PSOs, which to some extent can be justified on the grounds of the widely differing geographical, social and economic conditions prevailing between countries, is often subject to strong local political pressures, which can result in highly-subjective, politically-motivated decisionmaking. The result can be the imposition of an excessive number of PSOs that bear little relation to issues of peripherality, economic development and the availability of alternative transportation services. Sletten (2001) claimed that there were examples of strong political pressures being exerted by regional lobby groups in the development of Norway's PSOs during the 1990s.
Barriers to entry are evident within the PSO system. One particular challenge faced by PSO administering authorities is in ensuring that bidding processes are sufficiently competitive. The problem for many potential new entrants is that there can be significant sunk costs associated with operating PSO services particularly given that the contracted air carrier is awarded a monopoly on a route for only three years. This may partly explain why in some of the more remote low traffic-density PSO markets, long- While there appears to exist considerable scope for reform, it is beyond the aims of this paper to consider these issues in greater depth. The focus here is to contrast the ways in which countries have made use of the PSO mechanism.
Extent of PSO coverage
As far as assessing the extent to which countries have made use of the PSO mechanism is concerned, Table 1 
Minimum service levels
All PSOs in operation in September 2001 required the operator to satisfy fixed levels of service for the duration of the contract. In the majority of tenders, the air carrier is required to meet a minimum level of service frequency and / or a minimum level of seating capacity to be supplied over a specific period of time (day, week, month). Levels of service are established on the basis of what the administering authority considers to be appropriate service standards on each route given the volume of traffic and sector distance. For example, some routes in Scotland, such as Glasgow-Campbeltown, have a minimum requirement for two weekday round trips, while on Lerwick-Papa Stour (Shetland Islands), a route with much lower traffic, the minimum requirement is for two return trips on a Thursday. There may also be requirements related to the minimum size of aircraft and to the timetabling of services. Table 2 lists the various service level requirements contained in each country's PSOs.
All Scottish PSOs stipulate a minimum level of service frequency, with only the Glasgow routes containing specific minimum capacity requirements. The only exceptions to the minimum frequency requirement is to be found in the Canary Islands, where most routes contain minimum levels of seating capacity rather than service frequency. Here and in other regions where there are significant seasonal fluctuations in traffic (e.g. French mainland -Corsica, Italian Mainland -Sardinia) there are separate capacity requirements for both winter and summer seasons.
Carriers are often required to deploy aircraft with a minimum seating capacity, while in some countries only pressurised equipment must be used (e.g. Norway). Aircraft size requirements are to a significant extent driven by airfield operational limits, which restrict both the size and type of aircraft. For example, for services within the Orkney and Shetland islands in Scotland, the nine-seat BN Islander aircraft is the only commercial aircraft that can operate from the very short airstrips. In Norway, the requirement that carriers operate pressurised aircraft was to a large extent driven by political pressure from regional lobby groups.
Timetabling requirements feature in many PSO tenders. This is because the administering authority is seeking to ensure that schedules offered are as convenient as possible to the general public. For example, allowing passengers to complete a day trip to and from their destination and the ability to make convenient onward connections.
The requirement can be fairly detailed as in the case of German PSOs where services from Erfurt to both Munich and Berlin are required to arrive and depart within specific time-intervals. In France, it is fairly common for PSO tenders to stipulate that passengers should be able to spend at least seven, eight or nine hours at their destination before being able to return home. In the Irish Republic, the PSOs demand that there should be an early morning departure from the regional airport (Donegal, Galway, Kerry, Knock, Sligo) to Dublin and a return flight from Dublin at the end of the day. At slot-constrained airports in France, Germany and Italy, member state governments have exercised their right to reserve take-off and landing slots for PSO services under provisions contained in EC slot regulation 95/93 (CEC, 1993) 5 .
The specification of timetabling requirements has implications regarding both the positioning and utilisation of aircraft and therefore the overall costs of the operation and level of subsidy. Allowing air carriers the freedom to set their own timetables and adjust them on the basis of market conditions will have cost advantages. However, the difficulty with allowing carriers freedom in this regard is that while service frequency may be adequate, timings of services may be unsuitable, with passengers often being forced to spend an overnight stay at their destination or being unable to connect with onward flights from the main hub airport. Table 3 contrasts minimum service levels on a selection of PSO routes.
Differences highlighted in this sample of routes serve to illustrate disparities in the way PSOs are used by countries, reflecting different priorities and broader differences in the extent to which governments are prepared to intervene in the market to secure regional, economic and social policy goals. For example, on the Glasgow-Barra PSO a minimum level of service frequency and daily capacity is stipulated, but there is no timetabling requirement. By contrast, the Irish government specifies a level of frequency, capacity and aircraft type on the Dublin-Donegal PSO. Timetabling requirements are stipulated in the PSOs for Epinal-Paris Orly and Cologne/Bonn-Erfurt. Although in the former case, no specific times or time intervals are set, the PSO tender requires that schedules are established which guarantee at least eight hours at the destination.
The requirements set by PSO administering authorities are to a large extent driven by how far policy-makers are prepared to intervene through subsidies in the market to secure a specific level of service and fare. For example, Scottish PSO minimum service levels 5 Article 9 appear to be relatively more relaxed than in some other countries. This may be a reflection of an instinctively less interventionist approach by both the Scottish Executive and UK government. A more restrictive scheduling requirement may inflate the level of subsidy required and be an additional barrier to entry thereby reducing the competitiveness of the PSO tendering process. In some other countries, the levels of complexity contained in PSO minimum service requirements are greater, in particular, on
French Mainland-Corsica PSOs and to a slightly lesser extent on those imposed in Norway.
Regulating the cost of travel and level of subsidy
Most PSO tenders require operators to set air fares within a limit specified by the administering authority. The only major exceptions are in France where most of the mainland PSOs exclude any such requirement. Table 4 provides details on the approach to regulating fares within PSO contracts in different countries.
In Scotland, all PSOs stipulate a maximum one-way unrestricted economy fare. These range from €156 on Glasgow-Barra to €24 on Kirkwall to North Ronaldsay and Papa
Westray services. The Shetland Island PSOs have a fare limit of between €26 and €60.
There are no special fare discounts offered to categories of passengers on any of the Scottish PSO routes.
Fare restrictions are also applied on all the Irish PSO routes. Each PSO has unrestricted return fare limits of between €111 and €124. The operating carrier is required to make available a proportion of seats at these air fares. For example, on Dublin-Kerry, out of the minimum level of seats required throughout the day, sixty must be offered at €111, sixty at €124 and the remaining thirty can be offered at a fare of the airline's choosing.
However, there are currently no special discounts for specific categories of passenger. The extent of regulatory complexity in the PSO tender and the scale and degree to which fares are capped will determine the level of subsidy required to meet the contracted air carrier's operating deficit. It is probable that part of the differences were accounted for by the relatively high costs associated with operating the Dornier 228 on the Vardø-Kirkenes PSO compared to the Britten-Norman Islander, which is used on the inter-island services in Orkney and Shetland. However, differences in the maximum fares that can be charged are highly significant. The maximum one-way fare, which can be levied on Vardø-Kirkenes, is €68 compared to €61 on the Shetland services, in spite of the fact that operating costs appear to be much higher on the Norwegian route. While the range of minimum service requirements and limits on fare are key influencing factors, the level of subsidy on a PSO will also be influenced by how competitive the PSO tendering process is. The total level of subsidy in Norway for the tenders issued in 2000 was 15% higher than in 1997, mainly due to the lack of competing tender proposals being submitted (Sletten, 2001 ). This may be due to the existence of entry barriers, in particular, the risk of incurring high sunk costs as a result of operating groups of routes in Norway. It is also significant that so few examples exist of carriers from other countries operating such services. The only example of a PSO route from these three countries that is not operated by a local carrier is Dublin-Derry, which is served by the Scottish airline Loganair.
A number of factors influence the amount of subsidy that will be required to operate a given PSO service. The costs of operating a route will be strongly affected by the size and type of aircraft to be used. An older, unpressurised aircraft, such as a Shorts 360, will invariably be less expensive to run than a regional jet, for example. The route length, available airport infrastructure, the volume and seasonal nature of the traffic, and the type of route will determine the choice of aircraft to be employed. Operations to small islands such as those in the west of Ireland are really only feasible with small aircraft seating fewer than ten passengers. In other circumstances, a trade off will exist between service frequency and aircraft size. On a given route, for example, using a 19 seat aircraft may make it possible to offer three flights per day, whereas use of a more sophisticated 50 seater may restrict operations to once daily. The nature of the route will also affect the schedule to be provided. It may be that a service links an outlying island with a regional centre, in which case the traffic will be mostly point-to-point. In other instances, the service will be providing feeder traffic to connect with other regional operations.
To demonstrate the strange mix that is apparent between EU countries, two PSO routes are contrasted below. Information about the two operations is contained in Table 9 . It is interesting to note that it is the more heavily trafficked route between Dublin and Donegal that has the higher subsidy. The Scottish route from Glasgow to the Hebridean island of Tiree with around half the traffic of the Irish example requires 45% less subsidy.
Both routes have a service once a day during the week, with load factors in the low 40s. Fare levels are of key significance in explaining the differing levels of subsidy. On the Dublin-Donegal route, the maximum return fare was set at €108 whilst the equivalent price for the Glasgow-Tiree service was close to double this level at €240. In terms of subsidy per single passenger journey, the Tiree operation was a little more expensive.
Without the higher fare however, the level of subsidy would have been much greater. It is clear that the Irish Government is more generous in providing subsidies for essential air services than is the Scottish Executive.
PSO vs non-PSO: where do national governments draw the line?
One very important point to be made regarding the application of PSOs in the European Union is that national governments appear to have very different notions of which routes deserve to have PSO regulatory protection and associated subsidy and those that do not.
Norway is Aberdeen-Sumburgh is served three times daily with a 64-seat ATP aircraft operated by British Airways Citiexpress, while Oslo-Førde is served five times daily with a 37-seat Dash 8-100 operated by Widerøe Flyvesselskap. The overall level of weekly capacity between the two routes is therefore broadly similar. If one measures peripherality in terms of provision of surface transport services, then in both cases, travellers would face the alternative of considerably more lengthy journeys using alternative transport modes.
In the Norwegian case, the only alternative to the Førde-Oslo PSO air service is a once a day thirteen-hour journey by coach. The alternative to travelling by air between
Aberdeen and the Shetland Islands is a daily fourteen-hour voyage by sea, a trip often subject to delay as a result of adverse weather conditions especially during the winter months. However, in spite of the fact that air transport offers much more convenient access between Aberdeen and Sumburgh, the Scottish Executive and UK Government has chosen not to impose a PSO. In Norway the government has chosen to do otherwise on a similar route. As a consequence, pricing and output (capacity, frequency, aircraft size) decisions on Aberdeen-Shetland are subject to the commercial imperatives of the operator, while minimum service levels and maximum fares between Oslo and Førde are determined by the Norwegian government. In the North of Scotland, there is a campaign currently being waged by local stakeholders to extend the scope of PSOs in the face of a very strong perception amongst the general public that fares on non-PSO air services between peripheral regions and the mainland are very high. There is also an opinion widely expressed amongst stakeholders that lower fares will encourage greater mobility, thereby reversing recent declines in traffic levels on a number of routes (Press & Journal, 2002) .
In many cases the line between PSO and non-PSO designation is arbitrary and often the product of how successful regional lobby groups have been at influencing national The Dublin-Kerry PSO route in the Irish Republic is also very similar to AberdeenSumburgh, in terms of sector distance, traffic volume, capacity and frequency offered.
The key point however in this case is that Sumburgh in the Shetland Islands is more peripheral relative to Aberdeen, than Kerry is to Dublin. Whilst it takes approximately four hours to travel by train from Killarney (County Kerry) to Dublin, it takes some fourteen hours to travel by sea from Aberdeen to Lerwick (Shetland Islands).
One problem highlighted by regional stakeholders in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland is the fact that the motivations for expanding the scope of PSOs have more to do with achieving affordable airfares and improved flight times, rather than simply maintaining access. While some low-density peripheral routes are being provided commercially they are subject to constraints imposed by aircraft scheduling, resulting in flight timings that make day-trips either impossible or very difficult to achieve. A PSO could address this problem by stipulating departure and arrival times, as well as service frequency. The affordability of air travel has become a key policy issue in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland where there is growing anecdotal evidence of comparatively high fares (Press & Journal, 2002) . If demand were sufficiently price elastic, subsidy levels need not be high.
Clearly, the result of member-state level designation of PSOs is that significant imbalances exist in the provision of air services to small communities between different regions across the EU (Reynolds-Feighan, 1995) . As a consequence, EU-level administration of PSOs has been suggested as an alternative to the existing regime, whereby PSOs would be adopted on the basis of common and transparent criteria as exists in the US Essential Air Services Programme. The current PSO system incorporates an element of subsidiarity in decision-making. This is achieved through, on the one hand, establishing a common EU-wide legal framework to administer PSOs, with, on the other hand, issues such as which routes should be subsidised and how much subsidy should be paid, being left to the discretion of member states who make decisions on the basis of their own economic and regional policy goals. However, by granting member states this discretion, imbalances in provision, affordability and access do occur and may run counter to broader EC social, economic and regional policy objectives. For example, the European Commission has made various long-term policy commitments to enhancing economic and social cohesion across the Union. Central to achieving this aim must be to have a sustainable transport strategy which is able to deliver enhanced mobility and access between peripheral regions and major economic and political decision-making centres. A fully transparent and non-discriminatory EU-level administered social air services programme would to some extent assist in the attainment of these broader economic and social aspirations. Greater mobility and accessibility for communities located in peripheral regions cannot be achieved universally by leaving key decisions to individual member states, as these will be influenced significantly by the degree to which regional interests are able to exert influence over national government policy.
Conclusions
This paper has highlighted differences in terms of the degree to which member states have adopted the PSO mechanism in respect of air transport services. Countries such as
France and Norway have made extensive use of PSOs. In the case of Norway, this is mainly due to the fact that there are many small communities located in remote regions where air transport is the only viable means of public transport. By contrast, in France some of the routes that have been given PSO status have convenient surface transport alternatives and some have large traffic volumes. Germany is increasingly making use of the PSO mechanism, with regional governments using PSOs as part of a broader economic strategy to achieve a greater degree of integration between East and West German economies. In all three of the above-mentioned countries, national government policy-makers appear to be more receptive to regional political pressures than in the UK where intensive lobbying by regional stakeholders in the Highlands and Islands has failed to persuade both the national government and the Scottish Executive to expand the scope of the PSO mechanism to other routes.
As a result of a less than enthusiastic view of the role of PSOs in air transport, the system has not been adopted to the same extent in the UK as it has been in other countries (UK DETR, 1999) . This is in spite of the fact that many communities located in peripheral regions have faced problems of maintaining conveniently timed and affordable air services, which to some extent could have been ameliorated through the use of PSOs.
consequent imbalances in the provision of air services, there are convincing arguments for centralising the administration and funding of PSOs at EU-level. This, in theory at least, could result in a more efficient and equitable distribution of subsidy, and a greater degree of consistency with broader EU economic, social and regional development goals.
An investigation of the price elasticities of demand for air travel between various peripheral communities and their corresponding economic centres would be required if such an approach were to be adopted. How an EU-level system could be implemented is beyond the scope of the paper, but would also form a useful topic for research. Reynolds-Feighan, A. (1999) 
